Crate ojak_sig 

Signatures and proofs: HTTP Signatures (draft-cavage, and RFC 9421 with RSA or Ed25519) and the policy an inbox holds them to, FEP-8b32 Object Integrity Proofs (eddsa-jcs-2022, and the post-quantum mldsa44-jcs-2024), Linked Data Signatures (RsaSignature2017), and did:key.

They do no I/O: callers supply byte slices, header pairs, keys, the time and, to make a key, randomness. Ojak fetches keys and sends requests with them, and re-exports this crate as ojak::sig.

Re-exports

pub use signature::PrivateKey;

Modules

did

did:key, the DID method every portable object (FEP-ef61) can be verified with, because it needs no resolution: the DID is the key.

digest

Digests of a request’s body: the Digest header (RFC 3230) draft-cavage signatures cover, and the Content-Digest field (RFC 9530) RFC 9421 ones do.

integrity

FEP-8b32 Object Integrity Proof verification (eddsa-jcs-2022 and mldsa44-jcs-2024).

linked_data

Linked Data Signatures: RsaSignature2017, as Mastodon makes and checks them (ActivityPub::LinkedDataSignature).

rfc9421

HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421).

signature

HTTP Signature (draft-cavage-http-signatures) for ActivityPub federation.

verification

Checking a signed request that arrives in an inbox.

Structs

SenderKey

The key an actor signs deliveries with.

Enums

Error

Why something could not be signed or verified.

Scheme

An HTTP signature scheme.

Traits

CryptoRng

The randomness keys are made with, which the caller supplies: the system’s (rand::rngs::SysRng behind rand_core::UnwrapErr, or rand::rng()), or a device’s own. A marker trait for securely unpredictable infallible RNGs